Tag Archives: collision

Some Dutch roundabouts

Dutch roundabouts have received a lot of publicity, notably here: https://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/tag/roundabout/

Roundabout design in the Netherlands has seen a long process of trial and error. A design used until bicyclists complained strongly enough about it placed the bikeway away from the circular roadway, but cyclists were required to yield. Here is an explanation of Dutch roundabout design developments.

http://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2011/05/12/priority-for-cyclists-on-roundabouts-in-the-netherlands/

The current preferred design places the bikeway away from the circular roadway, and motorists are required to yield, as shown in this video below. That clears up yielding issues.

Here is a video of a roundabout outside the city of s’Hertogenbosch, put forward as an example of good design.

There is a long discussion of this roundabout, among others, on Facebook.

This is a rather large roundabout at the intersection of major highways, and with moderate deflection on entry or exit.  Looking here in Google Maps,  it’s clear that the highway in the background at the left is a bypass around the city of s’Hertogenbosch — though not a limited-access highway like the one which appears in the distant background in the video.

This roundabout was constructed in connection with the new bypass road around the city. Google Street View from 2009 shows the roundabout under construction. A sidelight on this observation is that Dutch practice does consider motor traffic. Two of the legs of the intersection at the roundabout are new roads being constructed at the same time.

I’ve been told by a knowledgeable person that the  bikeways on either side of the highways are supposed to be one-way, but the only destinations along these bikeways are at intersections — reducing the temptation to ride opposite traffic.

The design requires a lot of space because the circular bikeway is  much larger than the circular roadway. The roundabout  is outside a city, but nonetheless, it appears that several houses had to be demolished or moved to make way for this roundabout.

The installation here  places separate bikeways (red asphalt) and walkways (paver blocks) outside the circular roadway. Bicycle traffic shown in the video is light. If bicycle traffic were heavy, it would result in  congestion of motor traffic because motorists yielding to cyclists could not enter or exit the roundabout. Having a path (or for that matter, crosswalks) around the outside of a roundabout obviates the main advantage of the roundabout, that traffic can keep moving. Only grade separation would avoid this for both bicyclists and pedestrians. Motor vehicles and bicycles sharing the roadway would avoid the bicyclists’ causing congestion, but would not be as attractive for bicyclists lacking in skill and confidence..

If you look at the video full-screen, you can see a number of details which are not evident in the small window on this page. I am most interested in the interactions and negotiations for right of way, which are the central issue with mobility and safety in any intersection which is not traffic-signal controlled.

Expectation in the Netherlands is that motorists will yield wherever they see shark-tooth markings. The path around the outside of the roundabout is brought out to the entry and exit roads at a right angle and far enough outside the roundabout so that motorists will be able to see approaching bicyclists. Ohio resident Patricia Kovacs has investigated roundabouts in that state and demonstrated that motorists don’t even yield to pedestrians. She has posted some comments about roundabouts on this blog and in the Facebook thread mentioned earlier.

Some cyclists in the s’Hertogenbosch video are shown looking to their right as they pass paths coming in from their right, for example at 0:55 and 2:25, but many are shown not turning their heads to look for conflicting motor traffic. That is to say, they are putting their complete faith and trust in motorists to yield to them, which is a comment on Dutch expectations for motorist conduct. There is an especially stunning example of this at 1:59, where a cyclist powers through an intersection as motorists approach from the left, inside the roundabout, and the right, entering it. However, at 6:07, a motorist stops abruptly at an exit to the roundabout as a fast cyclist comes around from the right.

One cyclist leaves the roundabout on the left side, opposite the intended direction, at 1:38 in the video.  Another is riding around the roundabout clockwise at 2:40 and apparently while talking on a mobile phone.

At 2:34, a motorist is shown slowing to yield to a cyclist who turns right rather than to cross the exit of the roundabout. With no lane changing or negotiation betwen motorists and cyclists, the motorist did not have a way to know which way the cyclist would go.

Cyclists carry various objects in their hands or on the handlebars. At 6:40, a cyclist is carrying something which looks like a hockey stick.

At 7:18 a young woman has a disabled bicycle and is walking.

Now let’s look at some other Dutch roundabouts.

A roundabout inside s’Hertogenbosch, here,  has the bikeway immediately adjacent to the circular roadway, so that cyclists are hidden directly behind — not next to — exiting vehicles. The video shows motorists required to yield to cyclists in spite of this right-hook threat.

Here’s the video of the roundabout. Are the cycling facilities safe, as claimed? Or if safety is achieved here, is it maybe achieved in another way? You decide.

The description of the video indicates that this roundabout is rather new. Its design appears to be restricted by the small available space at an urban intersection.

Some notable interactions:

At 0:20, a car brakes rather abruptly. Shortly thereafter, a motor scooter passes through the roundabout on the roadway.

At 0:30 and again at 0:53, a car blocks the bikeway to allow a pedestrian to cross in a crosswalk which is just outside the bikeway.

Most bicyclists are not paying any attention to the traffic in the roundabout, At 0:45, a bicyclist is looking down at a cell phone, but at 0:50, 1:10, 1:29, 1:53, 2:03 and 2:10,  and a few additional times, bicyclists perform a shoulder check. The one at 2:03 does this while also carrying a cell phone in one hand.

At 1:49 and again at 2:20, there is a motorcycle in the bikeway, waiting along with bicyclists to enter the roundabout, and there is a bicyclist standing over his bicycle, facing opposite the direction of traffic.  It appears that he is having a conversation with the motorcyclist and a couple of pedestrians. They are blocking the crosswalk.

At 2:49, a motorist stops in the roundabout to yield to a bicyclist who does not cross, but instead turns right. The bicyclist gives a right-turn signal, but too late for the motorist to react, and in any case, a prudent motorist would not risk that the bicyclist would go straight even though signaling. The design of the roundabout does not make the bicyclist’s intentions obvious.

At 2:58, a bus barely outpaces a bicyclist through the roundabout. The bicyclist turns right, but the bus driver has no way to know that he will. The bus driver is either very highly skilled at judging the bicyclist’s speed, or reckless. The bicyclist would have had to yield to the bus if going slightly faster and continuing around the roundabout.

Starting at 3:00, several bicyclists enter traveling the wrong way on the bikeway or sidewalk. Some turn right but others pass close to a doorway which a pedestrian has just exited, and a blind corner, and cross from right to left in the crosswalk or bikeway. An articulated bus enters the roundabout and these bicyclists pass behind it. Other bicyclist traveling counterclockwise around the roundabout will have to yield to the long bus, though this occurs outside the field of view of the video.

At 3:45, bicyclists share the bikeway around the roundabout with a skateboarder and motor-scooter rider.

Almost all the bicyclists are pedaling about 40 rpm.

Here’s a roundabout where bicyclists go around square corners: http://goo.gl/maps/lxfc2

And a little roundabout with advisory bike lanes at some of the entrances: http://goo.gl/maps/HK908

In the so-called “shared space” roundabout in Drachten, cyclists share space with pedestrians. The meaning of the term “shared space” is very different here from its more usual meaning, that motorists, bicyclists and pedestrians all operate in the same space.  In the Drachten roundabout, bicyclists and pedestrians share space — as on shared-use paths in the USA — but are strictly separated from motor traffic except in crossings, as in the other Dutch roundabouts. The space around the margins of the Drachten roundabout also serves as a pedestrian plaza.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B88ZVrKtWm4

I’m poking around in YouTube and Google maps. Here’s a roundabout in YouTube — http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXUF97p8fXQI — location not given, as is usual in such promotions, but I found it in Google Maps by searching on the name of one of the businesses nearby: http://goo.gl/maps/Jd2ED. A special feature made the roundabout practical: the buildings are set far back at a 45-degree angle on each corner. The circular bikeway around the outside makes it possible for motorists to see cyclists in order to yield (though motorists don’t always, as the video shows) and greatly adds to space requirements, which already are large for a roundabout. There wouldn’t be room for such a roundabout at many urban intersections.

Here’s a blog post which includes the video just described and others of the same roundabout, and describes different types of Dutch roundabouts. http://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/a-modern-amsterdam-roundabout/

Another roundabout in Amsterdam is of the spiraling Turbo Roundabout design, with a path close around the outside and scary sight lines which place a cyclist too far to the right to be in view of a motorist exiting the roundabout: http://goo.gl/maps/fQybJ and street view, http://goo.gl/maps/LU1ww . Traffic signals have had to be placed at the exits to mitigate these conflicts. This is a triple roundabout with a tramway going around the inside, also requiring traffic signals.

The left and center roundabouts in this overhead view, http://goo.gl/maps/Q3jIy also are of the bikeway around the outside type: but the rightmost one, in a wooded area, is of the newer type.

Dutch roundabouts are  of several types for motor traffic, but the major difference for bicyclists is whether they travel around the outside of the roundabout, or there are grade separations. There are no examples like the small modern roundabouts and neighborhood traffic circles in the USA, where bicyclists share the roadway with motor vehicles.

Here is an example of grade separation: https://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2011/05/26/multi-level-roundabout-the-safest-solution-for-a-junction/

And here is a showcase example of grade separation — replacing an installation much like the one shown in the first video embedded in this post : https://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2012/08/23/spectacular-new-floating-cycle-roundabout/

Roundabouts are expensive and take up a lot of space.  Many of the promotions we are seeing of Dutch facilities ignore these limitations and the compromises they exact and/or celebrate the newest and most impressive examples.

Protected?

The cyclist’s comment on this Youtube video: “This is why turn signals are important. Had she used a turn signal, I would have stayed back and let her turn. But because she didn’t use one, I assumed she was going straight.”

Let’s take a look into the situation.

The car was initially stopped, second in line at a traffic light. Then the light turned green. The cyclist was approaching in the separated bikeway from the car’s right rear, off to the side. As the motorist initiated her turn, the cyclist wouldn’t be visible in the motorist’s passenger-side rear-view mirror. The motorist would have had to turn her head sharply to the right to see the cyclist, but she needed to look ahead to steer and avoid other potential conflicts. Yes, she should have used her turn signal, but again, she was supposed to yield to the cyclist, not the other way around, and the location of the bikeway made it easy for her not to notice the cyclist.

What are solutions to this problem?

* Well, certainly, drivers should use their signals.

* Bicyclists need to be aware of these conflict situations, and it’s best not to make assumptions.

* Bikeways like this create the appearance of safety because they assuage “fear to the rear” but in urban and suburban areas, most car-bike crashes are due to crossing and turning conflicts, including the one shown in the video, the classic “right hook” — and also the “left cross” (car turns left into the path of an oncoming cyclist). This is a two-way bikeway on one side of a street and so it placed the cyclist farther outside the view of the turning motorist, and can also lead to “Left hooks” and “right crosses”. Germany no longer recommends two-way bikeways like this, as the safety record has proved to be especially poor.

* To avoid these conflicts, the bikeway needs an exclusive signal phase when other traffic doesn’t turn across it. But that will result in more delay for bicyclists and motorists alike. This bikeway also crosses driveways where the barrier is interrupted.

* A bikeway in a corridor separate from streets, a bike route on lightly-used streets, ordinary striped bike lanes or wide outside lanes avoid the problems with a separated bikeway.

The location, in Seattle, Washington, USA.

PeopleforBikes Interprets Boulder Data

Here’s a quick review of an article by Michael Andersen of the PeopleforBikes Green Lane Project about the City of Boulder, Colorado’s removing what he calls a “protected bike lane”. I prefer to call it at barrier-separated on-street bikeway, avoiding a value judgment. Let’s see what the article in fact establishes.

graph in streetsblog article

Graph in Streetsblog article

According to the graph (copied above) and numbers in the article, the installation achieved a major reduction in collisions between motor vehicles at the expense of a 2.5 time increase in motor-vehicle-bicycle collisions. The article states that bicycle volume went up by 54%, and so the car-bicycle crash rate went up by about 1.6 times. Most car-bike crashes in urban areas involve crossing and turning movements. Forcing motorists to cross a bikeway to enter a travel lane, and forcing bicyclists and motorists to start turns from the wrong side of each other, make these crashes more difficult to avoid.

But the story gets more interesting if you click on the article’s link to city data. The left pie chart at the bottom of the city-data infographic shows crashes per year before the installation and the right pie chart, crashes per week following the installation. There were, on average, 11.3 car-bike crashes per year before the installation and 3 in 8 weeks, about 20 per year, afterward. That comes out to an increase of about 1.7 times, but the afterward sample is very small (3 crashes) and seasonal variation isn’t accounted for. The comparison has no validity.

Now look again at the graphs in the article. They don’t accurately reflect these numbers. The “before” bar reports about 0.15 car-bike crash per week or 8 per year, not the 11.3 per year in the pie chart, and so the graph shows an increase in bicycle crashes even greater than the numbers would suggest .

So, to sum up, the article reports a reduction in car-car crashes, but a large increase in car-bike crashes — while defending the bikeway as “protected” and failing to note that there isn’t enough “after” data to produce any statistically valid comparison.

Oh, and there’s also this, on the second page of the infographic:

“The bicycle volume increase along the corridor is consistent with the increase the city typically sees when school is back in session.”

The cyclist counts, unlike the crash counts, are robust. About half the increase is attributable to the school’s being back in session, not to installation of the separated bikeway — a point which Andersen neglects to mention.

To sum up:

What does the article say about the safety of the Boulder facility? Nothing. No conclusion can be drawn from the data, but despite that the Green Lane Project shot itself in the foot with a graph showing a large increase in bicycle crashes.

What does the say about bicycle use? Maybe an increase of 20% or so due to installation of the bikeway, though some of that may only have been transferred from another street.

What does the article say about the quality of Green Lane Project journalism? I think that I’ve made my point but you can answer that for yourself.

Duck Boat crashes

We had a duck boat run into a motor scooter from behind on Saturday, May 7, 2016 in Boston, killing one of the riders. It isn’t clear from the news story why this happened, though I expect that the poor forward visibility from the duck boat was a factor. Did the motor scooter operator pull ahead of the duck boat, riding and stopping in its large blind spots? Or did the duck boat operator run into the back of the motor scooter in spite of its being in hiss field of view? As usual with crashes involving two-wheelers — bicycle, motor scooters, motorcycles — and despite there having been many eyewitnesses, the Boston Globe offers no information as to the cause of the crash. Investigation is underway, although if it proceeds as with recent bicycle crashes, detailed results may not be made available for a long time, if at all.

Another duck boat crash occurred in Seattle, 5 killed, 62 injured — but that one was due to failure of an axle, which sent the duck boat into the side of a bus in an oncoming lane of traffic.

What is to be learned from these crashes?

For one thing, the duck boats are surplus from the Second World War. Though they served gallantly in that war, they are over 70 years old now: mechanical failures are not out of the question. The duck boats’ design as amphibious vehicles placed the driver high above the road over a high hood, with poor visibility to the front — a problem which has led to fatalities of pedestrians in crosswalks with large trucks. The duck boats do not have a front bumper, but instead, have a hull which can push unfortunate pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles underneath. These vehicles probably would not be legal, except that they are antiques.

Another issue with the Boston crash may be of education. Did the motor scooter driver not understand the peril of riding in blindspots of large vehicles? Boston is relentlessly installing bicycle facilities which direct bicyclists to ride into blindspots. It does not appear that the collision involved any such installation, but motor scooter operators are permitted under the law to use them, and their existence, along with a lack of instruction as to their perils, contributes to hazardous behavior elsewhere as well.

In the context of all these issues, my misgivings about the Vision Zero campaign described in the Boston Globe on April 17 need no further mention.

Another crosswalk confusion, and a fatality

In response to my post about confused yielding requirements where shared-use paths cross streets, Ryan Reasons has published comments on a recent fatal truck-bicycle crash in the Seattle, Washington area.

The photo below is from the KOMO TV/radio station news photo gallery.

view of crash scene

View of crash scene

My response to Ryan’s comments went into enough detail that I have decided to make a post of it. My response follows his comments below.

Ryan’s comments

@John S. Allen
The sort of confusion you describe may have cost Gordon Gray his life last Wednesday after he collided with a cement truck. The sheriff’s department says that Gray, a 70-year-old bicyclist from Washington state, was cycling on a MUP when he ran a stop sign, entered a street running parallel to the MUP and was struck.

King County Sheriff’s Sgt. Stan Seo says the Kenmore man was biking southbound on 65th Avenue Northeast Wednesday morning when he was hit by a cement truck heading west on Northeast 175th Street. Seo said Friday that according to investigators, it appears the cyclist did not stop at a stop sign and was hit in the intersection. He says the cyclist had turned off the Burke-Gilman Trail shortly before the accident.
The Associated Press, Komonews.com

If one accepts Sgt. Seo’s account of the events leading to the collision, then Gray was cycling on the MUP when he turned onto 65th Avenue to enter Northeast 175th street. (See this Google street map.) [You may  click on the link to open the view in Google maps, or click on the image below  to enlarge it — John Allen]

Location of Gordon Cray crash

Location of Gordon Gray crash

Note that the Google map shows three stop signs of possible relevance. The stop sign on 65th Avenue is located just north of the MUP and crosswalk. The other two stop signs are located on the MUP at opposite ends of the crosswalk.

Once Gray entered 65th Avenue from the MUP and headed south, did Gray have a legal obligation to stop at the stop sign on 65th Avenue? I don’t think so, because after turning south onto 65th Avenue the stop sign was behind Gray and facing north.

Let’s assume Gray committed a traffic violation (running a stop sign) when he turned from the MUP onto 65th Avenue. Does that mean Gray is legally at fault for a collision which occurred on his subsequent turn from 65th Avenue onto Northeast 175th Street?

The account given by local law enforcement suggests Gordon Gray will be blamed for his own death, even if Gray is not fully at fault. That seems like an injustice for Gray, an undeserved vindication for confusing cycling infrastructure, and fuel for more of the ugly jeers that accompany the deaths of cyclists who truly are at fault.

My response:

This is an interesting situation, and especially so as cyclists’ exiting from bikeways into parallel streets becomes more common with the increasing number of sidepaths (or “cycle tracks”, or so-called “protected bike lanes”). The path in question runs parallel to and just north of an east-west street (Northeast 175th Street) and crosses another street (65th Avenue) which Ts into it from the north, with a marked crosswalk. There are stop signs for the path at either end of the crosswalk, and there is a stop sign on 65th Avenue Northeast before the crosswalk, as is usual. So, once Gordon Gray was in the crosswalk, there was no stop sign directing him to stop at Northeast 175th Street.

This is not the same situation I described in the earlier blog post. What I described is the confusion from having stop signs at the ends of a crosswalk. Traffic in the street is supposed to yield to pedestrians in the crosswalk but confusion arises because the stop signs indicate that cyclists in the crosswalk must yield to traffic in the street it crosses. These two requirements contradict one another. The confusion manifests itself in drivers on the street stopping and yielding to cyclists, whom the stop signs direct to stop and yield to the drivers in the street. It is unclear who may proceed. In practice, the cyclists usually proceed, and often without coming to a complete stop, but also cyclists are faster than pedestrians, and a motorist’s stopping often requires a cyclist to stop when they would otherwise not have to, because the motor vehicle would have passed before the cyclist reached the crosswalk. There are also the issues which occur at other crosswalks, that the first motorist in one lane may stop, but a motorist in another lane may not, requiring extra caution of cyclists due to their higher speed and longer stopping distance than those of pedestrians.

What you describe appears to be that cyclist Gordon Gray entered the crosswalk, and then entered the parallel street. Indeed, there was no stop sign facing him once he had entered the crosswalk, as he did not pass the stop sign for traffic on 65th Avenue Northeast. The legalities here are somewhat confusing. Probably the stop sign before the crosswalk did not apply to entry onto the parallel street. Was Gray required nonetheless to yield before entering the parallel street? He would have been, if he had passed the stop sign on 65th Avenue Northeast. A T intersection without a stop sign is an uncontrolled intersection, and so he would still be required to prepare to yield, perhaps also to yield: in some states, at least Massachusetts, where I live, stop signs are not posted where one street Ts into another, but yielding is required. A concern for self-preservation would also require being prepared to yield, whatever the legalities.

There are a few things which the news report does not indicate:

  • Which way was Gray going? Was he originally westbound on the path? Then he would have had to look behind himself for the truck.
  • Was he attempting to head eastbound on Northeast 175th Street (or westbound on the wrong side), and so he was attempting to cross in front of the truck?
  • Just what was the truck driver doing, or about to do? There is a large concrete plant with two driveways, across Northeast 175th street from 65th Avenue. Concrete mixer trucks in the same colors as those in the news photo are visible parked there in the Google Maps overhead view. It is possible, for example, that the truck driver was signaling a turn, suggesting to Gray that he would turn left into the driveway east of 65th Street Avenue Northeast, but instead was continuing into the next driveway when his truck struck Gray. The location of the truck in the photo at the top of this post suggests that.

Some thoughts about self-driving cars

Google’s report on its self-driving cars:

http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en/us/selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0515.pdf

Most than half of the collisions reported in this document are slow-speed rear-enders of the Google cars. That’s unusual. It might be that the behavior of the Google cars is more cautious than what human drivers expect, so the Google cars stop more often abruptly or at unusual places, and so are not tailgater-friendly. I’d suggest that the Google cars might be equipped with a rear-facing warning device.

It seems to me that self-driving cars will be able to avoid any collision where a human driver could avoid fault, and others. In other words, operators of non-automated vehicles (including bicycles) and pedestrians who follow the conventional rules of the road will be able to operate safely around automated vehicles. Vehicles with automated crash avoidance (not necessarily completely automated vehicles, even) will not rear-end bicycles, and so the premise of fear from the rear evaporates if automated crash avoidance becomes universal with motor vehicles. Self-driving cars will not be able to avoid collisions where avoidance would require violating the laws of physics. Vehicles with automated crash avoidance will be able to avoid some collisions in which the potential colliding vehicle or pedestrian is outside the field of view of a human driver, such as right-hook collisions, as long as there is a clear sight line to the automated vehicle’s sensor. Same for a large truck’s high hood which prevents the driver from seeing a pedestrian crossing in front.

Automated vehicles will not be able to avoid left-cross collisions where the bicyclist or motorist is passing on the right of other vehicles and concealed by them, or pedestrian dart-out collisions. The concept of fully networked vehicles is supposed to address this problem. All vehicles approaching the same place in the road network are envisioned as communicating with each other even when they are hidden from each other’s view. As someone with an electrical engineering degree, I consider this at best a very difficult proposition, and it might be described as a pipe dream. Bandwidth, interference and reliability issues lead me to ask “what could possibly go wrong?” Also, instrumenting every object on the road is only practical on a limited-access highway — no, not even there, because there will still be breakdowns, wild animals, debris. On other roads, is every pedestrian going to carry a transponder? I don’t think so.

Automated crash avoidance is easily hacked by rolling a trash can out into the roadway, and the like. The caution which automated crash avoidance inherently incorporates changes the dynamic from the one among humans, which can involve a game of bluff. To me, this means that automated vehicles will be extra-cautious in the presence of other drivers and pedestrians who do play the game of bluff, and so the progress of automated vehicles will be slow and erratic in, for example, Boston traffic.

All this leads to the question: does behavior change as these vehicles become more common? Does infrastructure change? Every new technology takes a while to find its feet. As Marshall McLuhan said, “We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future.” Do conditions become better or worse for bicyclists and pedestrians? And why? We have some control over this depending on the direction which is set for the technology, but also, time will tell.

Another serious issue I’ve heard mentioned is the car which is not only driverless but passengerless. There is potential for an increase in traffic if a car can be called to meet a person (like a passengerless taxi), or directed to drive around and around the block empty when a parking space can’t be found. I can’t say how serious this problem will be. To some extent, that depends on the extent of freedom afforded to people’s control over the driverless cars. It’s an interesting legal question involving private use of public space. We already face this question with congestion-pricing schemes. But on the other hand, fewer cars on the road might be needed, because the car-sharing model works better when a car can be called rather than only stationed. Again, time will tell.

When slow is too fast

The basic speed limit, not to go too fast under the existing conditions, is often lower than the posted speed limit.

When facilities like the bike lane in the video are built in which 10 mph, or even 5 mph, is excessive speed, and, worse, when we are required by law to use them, then we get clobbered three ways. If we ride at safe speeds, the utility of bicycling for transportation and exercise is greatly reduced. If we ride faster than is safe, then we may crash, and be held at fault. If we avoid the facilities, we may be cited for not staying in our place, and harassed. And this, when bicyclists rarely can ride at the posted speed limit.

I’ll also quote my friend Mighk Wilson’s comments about the video:

It’s important to differentiate between “fault,” which is a legal matter for our purposes here, and “contributing causes.” If we only address fault we will usually fail to prevent crashes…

So who contributed to your crash? Obviously the motorist…he’s 100% legally at fault. But the designer of the bike lane also contributed, by leading you into blind spots where you’d be in conflict with turning vehicles. You yourself contributed by traveling at a speed at which you were unable to see, react and brake for the turning vehicle. Our bicycle advocacy groups contributed by insisting that bicyclists should always get to pass stopped motor traffic even when it’s risky to do so. Our land use planners contributed by allowing commercial driveways so close to major intersections. I could go on…

Part of the problem here is not only that the bike lane leads to blind conflicts, as Mighk points out, but also that it leads to false expectations of what is safe. I’d also add that planners, and lots of other people, contributed to causation of the crash by generating patterns of land use and mode choice which lead to traffic congestion. It is ironic that while it was only safe to travel at low speed in the bike lane, the traffic in the travel lane was stop-and-go, and had stopped completely. Whether a cyclist would have been able to travel safely at a higher average speed without a bike lane is open to question.

Monsere, Dill et al. — Not Yet a Review, But…

M. Kary, who prepared a review of the Lusk et al Montreal study, has had a preliminary look at the Monsere, Dill et al. study of barrier-separated on-street bikeways (“cycle tracks”) which the bicycle industry lobby PeopleforBikes is promoting as demonstrating their safety. Dr. Kary has given me permission to publish his comments here.

An Introduction To and Overview Of:
Monsere C, Dill J, et al. (2014) Lessons From The Green Lanes: Evaluating Protected Bike Lanes In The U.S. Final Report, NITC-RR-583

To begin with a platitude: traffic accidents are rare events. The totals are large only because the overall volumes of exposure are huge. Therefore, if considering safety in terms of outcomes rather than the underlying mechanisms of operation, any facility, no matter how poorly designed, will appear safe if examined over a short period of time.

But collecting data over a long period of time has its disadvantages too: not just cost and delay, but also the averaging, and therefore blurring, of the effects of various changing causes and circumstances. Nor does it work at all for facilities that are yet to be built. In response to these problems, engineers developed the methods of traffic conflict analysis. They can be seen as based on the following logical and kinematic necessities. First, in order for a collision to occur, the vehicles involved must eventually get on a collision course. Second, in order to get on a collision course, they must first get on a near-collision course. On the other hand, not all vehicles once on collision or near-collision course do end up colliding: their operators make course corrections and avoid that outcome. Such potentially dangerous but often ultimately safe trajectories, i.e. traffic conflicts, occur much more frequently than actual collisions, deaths, or injuries. If there exists a suitable relationship between the former and the latter, then conflict analysis can be used to study road safety at reduced cost, with better timing, and even via simulation modelling of facilities that have been designed but not yet built.

The theory and practice of conflict analysis for motor vehicles has been developed over something like a half a century of research. This has evolved to quantitative methods using not just traffic cameras, but also instrumented vehicles, automated data extraction, and theoretical concepts such as time to collision, gap time, gap acceptance, post-encroachment time, and many others. There is no such corresponding body of research for bicycles. Even if there were, it could never be as important to bicycle or pedestrian deaths and injuries as it is for the occupants of cars and trucks: for example, the latter vehicles never topple over at stops or just slip and fall, so that their occupants fracture an arm or strike their heads on a curb. In fact the majority of bicyclist injuries, even those requiring hospitalization, apparently involve only the bicyclist, making conflict analysis entirely or at least largely irrelevant to them.

On the other hand collisions with motor vehicles are major factors in cyclist deaths and injuries, and they are what cyclists worry most about. And even apparently bicycle-only crashes can be provoked by e.g. general fears or specific intimidations, or avoidance manoeuvres leading to loss of control. Thus there are also dimensions of traffic conflicts applicable to bicycling, but either inapplicable or less so to motor vehicle-only conflicts. Nor is every conflict visible or strictly kinematic: consider for example the effects of sudden and loud horn honking or engine revving.

With these fundamental limitations in mind, obviously traffic conflict analysis is a promising method for investigating important aspects of bicycling safety. The theory needs to be developed, so we can figure out what constitutes a high or low rate of conflicts, what types of conflicts figure what way into which accident types, and how vehicle operators and pedestrians cope with them, such as through hypervigilance, or avoidance of the area and thus diversion of problems to a different one.

Not only does the theory need to be developed, but also the methods of data extraction and analysis: the subjective review of traffic camera recordings, typically of low quality, is a mind-numbingly tedious, labour-intensive and error-prone task, that does not scale well.

The work of Monsere et al. (2014), Lessons From The Green Lanes: Evaluating Protected Bike Lanes In The U.S., should be considered a pilot project in this effort, although the authors themselves do not describe it as such.

Monsere et al. aimed to address six questions:

  1. Do the facilities attract more cyclists?
  2. How well do the design features of the facilities work? In particular, do both the users of the protected bicycle facility and adjacent travel lanes understand the design intents of the facility, especially unique or experimental treatments at intersections?
  3. Do the protected lanes improve users’ perceptions of safety?
  4. What are the perceptions of nearby residents?
  5. How attractive are the protected lanes to different groups of people?
  6. Is the installation of the lanes associated with measureable increases in economic activity?

Apart from noting that, as with most sociological research, their survey response rates were dismally low (23-33% overall, counting even only partially completed surveys as full responses), to produce a socioeconomically skewed sample (e.g. the bicyclists being 89% white, 68% male, 82% having at least a four-year college degree, and 48% with annual incomes over $100,000)— this overview of their work considers only the first part of their question No. 2.

Monsere et al. installed video cameras along short bicycle sidepaths (“protected lanes”, “cycle tracks”) constructed between approximately the summer of 2012 and the early summer of 2013 as part of the Green Lanes Project. These were in four U.S. cities, San Francisco (two 0.3 mile paths), Portland (one 0.8 mile path), Chicago (0.8 and 1.2 mile paths) and Washington (a 1.12 mile path; no cameras were installed in Austin, although sociological surveys were conducted there). They did their video recording chiefly at intersections, six in these four cities in the summer and fall of 2013. This was then presumably while the users were still in a cautious or exploratory state, as they got used to the new facilities.

Only 12-18, or in one case 20, independent hours of video were analyzed from each intersection. As each intersection examined was given a unique treatment, results cannot easily be pooled. These are very small numbers.

(This makes for substantially less than 120 hours total. The authors seem to say they analyzed 144 hours of video at intersections. This would mean that some of this total came from multiple cameras examining the same intersection at the same time. The authors do show frame captures from some of their cameras. This observer would find it difficult to correctly identify the conflicts from the views on display.)

As noted following the opening platitude, any facility, no matter how poorly designed, will appear safe if examined over a short enough period of time.

The six facilities examined were all so new (less than or little more than a calendar year old) that there were no injury or death data available for them. (For comparison, the entire city and island of Montreal, with all its thousands of intersections, averages of late about five cyclist deaths and 25-50 police-recorded serious cycling injuries per year.) Thus, there would not have been a way to use even many more hours of recording to examine for any relationship between the surrogate outcomes (conflicts, violations or errant behaviours) and the outcomes of most interest, deaths and injuries.

Further, as this was neither a before-after study nor a comparison with standard intersections, there is no way to know whether the numbers of observed conflicts, violations, or errant behaviours, were themselves high or low.

As to the actual results from this pilot project, the much touted headline was that there were only six minor conflicts found, out of nearly 12,900 bicycle movements through intersections. The most basic problems with this headline are:

1. It is the wrong comparison. The conflict rate has to be the number of conflicts divided by the number of occasions where at least two users capable of conflicting are present, e.g. a bicycle and at least one other bicycle, pedestrian, or motor vehicle. Thus the authors give figures of 7574 turning motor vehicles, but only 1997 turning motor vehicles with bicycles present. The corresponding conflict rates (which they normalize by the products of bicycle and motor vehicle movements, not by the numbers of bicycle movements alone) they give for the individual intersections therefore vary by factors of approximately 3 to 10, depending on which figures are used.

2. Six is the total of observed “minor” conflicts, not the total number of observed conflicts. There were also 379 “precautionary” conflicts with motor vehicles, 216 with pedestrians, and 70 with other bicycles.

3. Besides conflicts, there were numerous violations or other errant behaviours: e.g. 9-70% of bicycles and 7-52% of turning motor vehicles in the various intersection designs used the lanes incorrectly, 1-18% of turning motor vehicles in the various mixing zone designs turned from the wrong lane, 5-10% of motorists turned illegally on red arrows at intersections with bicycle-specific signals, and 7-23% of bicyclists disobeyed their signals.

4. Without any theory or model of how any of these occurrences or their frequencies relate to death, injury, or property damage, and without any before-after or non-sidepath comparison data— not to mention, with the very small numbers of observation hours— there are almost no safety implications, positive or negative. The only concrete result is that one of the local authorities apparently deemed the problem of motor vehicles turning from the wrong lane (18%), straddling lanes (another 17%), or entering the turn lane early (15%) to be so severe that they later removed the intersection treatment and replaced it with another design (at Fell and Baker in San Francisco).

5. The sociological surveys tell another story: one-third of all bicyclists surveyed said they had been involved in at least one near collision on the paths, while 2% experienced an actual collision. 23% had a near collision with turning cars, 1.8% an actual collision with turning cars; 19% a near collision with a pedestrian, and 0.4% an actual collision with a pedestrian.

In short: this is an interesting pilot project, whose methods are impractical for the amount of data collection needed for meaningful safety results. Even with better methods, conflicts are only one facet of the bicycling, and overall safety picture; while road designers and road users, whether bicyclists or motorists, have to consider more than just safety. Convenience, transit time, cost, and greenhouse gas emissions also matter. A cycle track that, like the downtown de Maisonneuve track in Montreal, lies largely dormant in the winter, but delays motor vehicle traffic in the winter and ties it up spring, summer and fall, will be of no help in reducing CO2 emissions. The much touted headline results from this study are selective, overblown, and misleading. Any facility will appear safe if examined over a short enough period of time, and surely 12 to 20 hours each is short enough.

Is the NACTO Guide a Design Manual?

In cities around the USA, politicians, under pressure from populist bicycling advocates, have pointed to the NACTO (National Association of City Transportation Officials) Urban Street Design Guide and directed their engineering staff to install treatments which it describes.

I’ll say right here that some of the treatments which the NACTO guide describes deserve attention and inclusion in national design standards — though their presentation in the NACTO Guide typically is flawed, inconsistent and incomplete. Why some deserving treatments are not included in the national design standards is a story for another time.

Other NACTO treatments are so troublesome that they are not widely applicable.

Engineers unfamiliar with bicycling issues may take NACTO designs at face value; other engineers may throw up their hands and comply, faced with the threat of losing their employment. Several engineers who have extensive background and expertise in design for bicycling have resigned, been fired or been demoted when they would not accept the NACTO designs.

What leads to these problems? To put it simply, the NACTO guide isn’t a design manual. It is a smorgasbord of design treatments formatted — right down to digitally-generated loose-leaf binder holes on what are, after all, Web pages — to look like a design manual to politicians and the general public. Bicycle manufacturers funded it to promote street designs which they expect will lead to greater bicycle sales. It lacks the vetting necessary for consistency and accuracy. Its purpose is to generate political pressure to apply the treatments it describes. It is weak on specifics: rife with errors, and with omissions even in describing the treatments it covers.

If I described all of my specific  concerns with the NACTO Guide, I’d be writing a book, so for now let’s just look at a two-page spread of the NACTO Guide, the pages about two-stage turn queuing boxes (2STQBs, for short).

Maybe by now you are inclined to think of me  as a naysayer, so, let me get down to some specifics to dispel that impression. I have had information about two-stage turn queuing boxes online for years, I think that they are a useful treatment, and I use two-stage turns: when I realize that I have reached the street where I need to turn left, but hadn’t merged to turn; when traffic is heavy and fast and I haven’t found an opportunity to merge; when ordinary left turns are prohibited. My favorite example is the left turn from Commonwealth Avenue onto the Boston University Bridge in Boston, Massachusetts, where a no-left-turn sign is posted: motorists have to go around a large loop.

Ok, now let’s consider the spread from the NACTO guide, below.

NACTO pages about two-stage turn box

NACTO pages about two-stage turn queuing box

I have placed that spread online as a PDF file, zoomable to any size you might like. You may click on the link or the image above to get a larger view while reading this text. The PDF will open in a separate browser window or tab. I’ve also posted parts of the NACTO pages in connection with the text below.

Issues of organization and use of technical language

The NACTO treatment of the two-stage turn queuing box presents issues of organization and of use of technical language.

Problems start with the title of the section. A proper title is not “Design Guidance”, otherwise, every section would be named “Design Guidance”. A proper title is the name of the device, here “Two-Stage Turn Queuing Box”. [And not “Queue” but” Queuing.”]

In a proper design manual, the terms “shall”, “should”, “guidance” and “option” go from strong to weak. “Shall” is imperative: for example, a stop sign shall be octagonal. Should, guidance and option statements are increasingly weaker, leaving more room for engineering judgment.

The terms “Required Features” and “Recommended Features” correspond roughly to “shall and “should” but do not have the explicit, legally-defined meanings of “shall” and “should”.

None of the drawings on the two pages are dimensioned, and no dimensions are given in the text. That is to say, these are not engineering drawings, they are only conceptual drawings. How big are the turn boxes supposed to be? Who knows? The width of travel lanes differs from one drawing to the next, but no explanation is given for that. When politicians start beating on the door for NACTO treatments, standards-setting bodies and traffic engineers have to try to fill in the missing information. For specific projects, that task often is passed along to hired consultants who make their living by promoting and designing special bicycle facilities. Yes, there is a conflict of interest.

Specific comments

Now, either click on the image of each section of the page below to open it in a separate browser tab, or zoom the PDF to at least 50% size so you can read the text in connection with my specific comments .(You may open it now if you didn’t already.)

Comments on the left-hand page

The left-hand page includes text which may look like design specifications, and drawings which may look like design drawings — to a layperson.

Left half of left-hand page

twostageturn_guidanceLL

Point 1: “An area shall be designated to hold queuing bicyclists and formalize two-stage turn maneuvers.” This is under the heading “Required Features.”  A 2STQB is only one way to turn left among others, an option, subject to engineering judgment or specific design warrants. There is neither the room nor the need for a 2STQB at most intersections. Lacking here is any statement as to where a 2STQB is appropriate, but the “shall” statement here is inappropriate: appropriate shall statements would describe what features are required if a 2STQB is installed. As of May 2014, the 2STQB is still in experimental status with the Federal Highway Administration — as are all details of its design, and so no “shall” statement at all is appropriate.

A proper design manual would include guidance about speed and volume of traffic; the additional delay usually required for a two-stage turn; whether bicyclists might take an alternate route entirely; whether use of the box is  mandatory, placing bicyclists who make other types of turns in violation of the law.

Point 4: “In cities that permit right turns on red, a no-turn-on-red sign shall be installed.”

According to the wording here, if the installation is not in a city, the sign is not required.

But also, the shall statement is overly broad, and incomplete. The sign is needed only if right-turning traffic would be in conflict with the bicyclists waiting in the 2STQB: unnecessary in the cross street if traffic turns right before reaching the box or cannot turn right, and unnecessary on the entry street if the cross street is one-way right-to-left. Does the sign belong on the entry street or the cross street, or both? That is not stated. Details, details…

Point 6: The comma makes nonsense of this sentence. Where is the box to be positioned?

The other, subsidiary “should” and “may” statements on this page also are contingent on official approval of the underlying design, and are lacking in detail.

Right half of left-hand page

twostageturn_guidanceLR

Something really leaps out at me here: take a look and see whether it leaps out at you too.

OK, ready? Three of the six illustrations show a line of travel (in blue) for bicyclists straight across an intersection and then illegally and hazardously turning right, directly into the face of approaching traffic in a cross street.

In showing this bizarre routing, the NACTO Guide also fails to address issues with the actual route which bicyclists might take.

Five of the six illustrations show that bicyclists would somehow turn 180 degrees in place. That requires dismounting and is slow and awkward. How would a bicyclist turn when the traffic light is about to change? When other bicyclists are already in the box? What about tandems? Bicycles pulling trailers? Bicycles carrying heavy baggage?

The drawings show a subtly implied but selectively addressed-threat: lanes where motorists travel are shown in a threatening shade of pink — whoops: except in the cross street where bicyclists ride head-on at motorists.

Four of the six illustrations show motor vehicles in right-hook conflict with bicyclists headed for the queuing box. The motor vehicles are turning out of the threatening pink area into what is portrayed as the safe zone– the right-hook zone. In two of the pictures,  vehicles have already impinged on the blue line which represents the path of bicyclists crossing the intersection. Green paint, which has become a catch-all warning of traffic conflicts in bicycle facilities, is shown in the queuing box, it is not shown in the conflict zone. (By way of comparison, Dutch practice in such conflict situations is that the motorist must always yield, and to use “shark teeth” markings to indicate a yield line.)

Two of the drawings show bike lanes in the door zone of parked cars.

The middle left illustration shows a receiving bike lane at the top, out of line with dashed markings in the intersection, so bicyclists bear right just before they cross a crosswalk, potentially colliding with pedestrians who would expect them to continue straight.

All of the illustrations show two-stage turns across two-lane one-way streets, though the two-stage turn queuing box is most useful where a conventional left turn is illegal, unusually difficult or hazardous — for example, when turning from a major, wide arterial street with heavy traffic, or one with trolley tracks in the median.

As already indicated, none of the drawings are dimensioned and no dimensions are given in the text.

Comments on the right-hand page

The right-hand page gives annotated pictures of conceptual installations, with angled views from overhead.

Left half of right-hand page

twostageturn_guidanceRL

The street going from bottom to top in the picture is one-way, as can be inferred by the direction in which vehicles are traveling. That the cross street is two-way may be inferred from the locations of traffic signals and the existence of the queuing box. A real design manual would be explicit about how a treatment would apply, depending on the directions of traffic in the streets.

The end of the traffic island next to the queuing box protrudes so far and is so sharply as to make right turns awkward. No explanation or guidance is given on this issue.

Traffic signals are shown for motor traffic on both streets, but no traffic signal is shown facing the separate bikeway in the street!

Point 3: “Shall” — mandatory — wording differs from that in the same point as made on the opposite page. A real design manual would have a single, consistent statement. “Queue box shall be placed in a protected area.” The queuing box shown here is not protected from right-turning traffic in the cross street. How would that right-turning traffic be managed, or is it permitted at all? Such issues are addressed in a real design manual.

Point 6: “Optional queue box location in line with cross traffic.” The preferred queuing box, then, is not in line with cross traffic. On getting a green light, bicyclists in the queuing box would have to merge left inside the intersection unless there is a receiving bike lane after the intersection, but none is shown. Merging inside an intersection results in hazardous conflicts and is generally illegal. What warrants the choice of one or the other option? It isn’t stated.

Point 8: The illustration shows motorists and a bicyclist inside the intersection, and so they must have a concurrent green light — or, they would if any signal were shown facing the bikeway. Markings guide bicyclists across the intersection, but also into the path of right-turning traffic. The bicyclist and the motorist in the right-hand lane at the bottom of the picture are on a collision course if the motorist turns right.

What is the meaning of the curved markings adjacent to the bicycle parking in the middle of the street? Does the lane with bicycle parking start as a lane with car parking, additionally hiding bicyclists from turning motorists? Or is this an additional lane for motor traffic, discontinued at the intersection, precisely where more lanes are needed to store waiting traffic? Not shown.

Right half of right-hand page

twostageturn_guidanceRR

There is a right-hook threat at both bike lane entries to the intersection.

Bicyclists headed from bottom to top in the bike lane are riding in the door zone of parked cars, and closer to the cars after crossing the intersection.

Point 9: As in the left half of the page, placing the queuing box to the right of the travel lane when there is no receiving lane ahead assures that motorists will overtake bicyclists in the intersection and that bicyclists will have to wait for motor traffic to clear before they can proceed. Motorists waiting to turn right will be stuck behind the bicyclists. Placement out of line with motor traffic is described as the option here, rather than as the preferred treatment as on the left side of the page, and the problem is acknowledged in the caption to this drawing, though no explanation for the different choices is given.

Point 10: A jughandle may be useful if traffic is so heavy or fast that bicyclists have difficulty merging to the normal left-turn position near the center of the street, but then traffic is also so heavy and fast that a signal is usually necessary, not merely to be considered — unless there is already one upstream.

Point 11: Yes, signage may be used, but what signage? A real design manual would show the signs and where they are to be placed.

Point 12: A bicycle signal might be installed, but where? for the entry? For the exit? Its timing?

Point 13: Guide lines, pavement symbols and/or colored pavement. Which? Where? Why?

Had enough?

Truck side skirts: reliable way to prevent cyclist fatalities?

No, not reliable. And they are also supposed to confer an aerodynamic advantage. Some do, some don’t.

Some have a smooth surface which can deflect a cyclist. That is still no guarantee that the cyclist will escape serious injury or death. Other side guards are only open frameworks which can catch and drag a bicycle. A lot of what I have seen is little more than window dressing.

The side guard in the image below from a post on the Treehugger blog has no aerodynamic advantage and could easily guide a cyclist into the rear wheel of the truck.

Photo of truck side with guard from Treehugger blog.

Photo of truck side with guard from Treehugger blog.

A cyclist can easily go under the side guard shown in the image below, from a Portland, Oregon blog post. A cyclist who is leaning against the side guard is guided into the sharp edge of the fender bracket and fender, and the front of the turning wheel, which can pull the cyclist down. There is another wheel behind the one in the photo.

Side guard on City of Portland, Oregon water transport truck

Side guard on City of Portland, Oregon water transport truck

The side guard on a Boston garbage truck in the photo below — my own screen shot from the 2013 Boston Bikes annual update presentation — is only an open framework which could easily catch and drag a bicycle.

Side skirt on City of Boston garbage truck

Side skirt on City of Boston garbage truck

A truck which is turning right off-tracks to the right. A cyclist can be pushed onto his/her right side, and goes under, feet to the left, head to the right. On the other hand, if an overtaking truck contacts the left handlebar end, or if the right handlebar end contacts a slower or stopped vehicle or other obstruction, the handlebar turns to the right and the cyclist slumps to the left, headfirst.

To be as effective as possible for either aerodynamics or injury prevention, side guards must cover the wheels. Though that is practical, none of the ones shown do.

But no practical side guard can go low enough to prevent a cyclist from going underneath. The side guard would drag  at raised railroad crossings, driveway aprons, speed tables etc. Even if the side guard did go low enough, it would sweep the fallen cyclist across the road surface, possibly to be crushed against a parked car or a curb.

Fatalities have occurred when cyclists went under buses, which have low side panels — but the wheels are uncovered. The Dana Laird fatality in Cambridge, Massachusetts is one example. Ms. Laird’s right handlebar end is reported to have struck the opening door of a parked vehicle, steering her front wheel to the right and toppling her to the left.

Dana Laird fatality, Cambridge, Massacchusetts, 2002

Dana Laird fatality, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002

The bicycling advocacy community, as shown in the blog posts I’ve cited, mostly offers praise and promotion of sub-optimal versions of side guards, a measure which, even if executed as well as possible, offers only a weak, last-resort solution to the problem of bus and truck underruns.

Most of the comments I see on the blogs I linked to consider it perfectly normal for motor traffic to turn right from the left side of cyclists, and to design infrastructure — bike lanes in particular — to formalize this conflict. The commenters also would like to give cyclists carte blanche to overtake close to the right side of large trucks, and place all the responsibility on truck drivers to avoid off-tracking over the cyclists.

Cyclists are vulnerable road users, but vulnerability is not the same as defenselessness. It is rarely heard from today’s crop of bicycling advocates, but a cyclist can prevent collisions with trucks and buses by not riding close to the side of them. There’s a wild contradiction in playing on the vulnerability, naiveté and defenselessness of novice cyclists to promote bicycle use with measures — particularly, bike lanes striped up to intersections — which lure cyclists into a deathtrap. Regardless of whoever may be held legally at fault in underrun collisions, cyclists have the ability to prevent them, and preventing them is the first order of business.

Want to learn how to defend yourself against going under a truck? Detailed advice on avoiding bicycle/truck conflicts may be found on the Commute Orlando Web site.

Additional comments about the political situation which promotes underrun collisions may also be found on that site.